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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of “scandals” have come to light in the
financial services industry around the world that have caused significant
harm to consumers and have cost the financial services industry
considerable sums, in terms of fines, redress, and legal costs. It has been
estimated, for example, that since the financial crisis in 2007, financial
services firms have paid aggregate fines in excess of $320 billion
worldwide in connection with employee misconduct.1
More significantly, the “scandals” and failures of governance in
financial services firms have damaged trust in the financial services
industry. For example, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England,
has stated that “the incidence of financial sector misconduct has risen to a
level that has the potential to create systemic risks by undermining trust in
both financial institutions and markets.”2
As noted by the Dutch regulator, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB),
“Trust is the foundation on which our financial system is built.”3 If the
financial services industry is not trusted, customers may choose to engage
less by investing less in their pensions, saving less, or purchasing fewer
financial services products. This, in turn, “damage[s] both the industry and

* Consultant, Eversheds Sutherland. One Earlsfort Centre, Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland.
1. Gavin Finch, World’s Biggest Banks Fined $321 Billion Since Financial Crisis, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-02/world-s-biggest-banks-fined321-billion-since-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/3CMQ-ZYL2].
2. Letter from Mark Carney, Chairman, Fin. Stability Bd., to G20 Leaders, at 7 (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P20160831.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5X7-EGFG].
3. MIREA RAAIJMAKERS ET AL., DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOUR AND
CULTURE: FOUNDATIONS, PRACTICE & FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 30 (2015) [hereinafter SUPERVISION
OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE], https://www.compliance-instituut.nl/wp-content/uploads/Supervisionof-Behaviour-and-Culture_tcm46-334417.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDC3-K83Z].
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the economy, by reducing the availability of capital for productive
purposes.”4
Also, the U.K. Banking Standards Board, the U.K. financial services
industry-funded body set up in 2015 that aims to promote high standards
of behavior and competence in the industry, recently stated:
A successful, dynamic UK economy needs a strong, stable banking
sector that serves the best interests of its customers. For the sector to
contribute fully to the economy and society it needs to be trusted; not
only by its customers (in the UK and globally), but also by its staff,
by potential employees, by regulators and by policy makers. Trust in
the sector has been damaged, and it is only the industry itself – by
demonstrating honesty, reliability and competence on a consistent
and collective basis – that can rebuild it.5

The introduction of increasingly onerous legal and regulatory
requirements on financial services firms, backed up by more intrusive
supervision by regulators and the imposition of more significant sanctions
on firms and individuals who have breached legal requirements, has led to
improvements in the industry in recent years. It is generally recognized,
however, that these developments, by themselves, do not sufficiently
address the industry problems, given that the misconduct that has arisen
appears to be symptomatic of a wider problem of “culture” in the financial
services industry that needs to be addressed.
As to the “cultural nature” of the problem, the then-Deputy Director
of the Bank of England, Minouche Shafik, described the problem as one
of “ethical drift” in the financial services industry; that “[c]learly it was
not the case of a few bad apples, but something was rotten in the entire
barrel.”6 Also, John Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of the New York Federal Reserve, stated in a June 2018 speech that
“underlying these scandals is often an inadequate corporate culture, where
accountability and ethical conduct have fallen by the wayside.”7
To address this cultural problem, regulators around the world have
increasingly focused their supervisory attention and resources on firms’
4. See generally Sue Jaffer, Nicholas Morris & David Vines, Why Trustworthiness is Important,
in CAPITAL FAILURE: REBUILDING TRUST IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 7–8 (2014).
5. What is the BSB?, BANKING STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk
/what-is-the-bsb/ [https://perma.cc/F9X3-S8FQ].
6. Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor, Markets & Banking, Bank of Eng., Panel Discussion at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference: From ‘Ethical Drift’ to ‘Ethical Lift’: Reversing
the Tide of Misconduct in Global Financial Markets 2 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2016/from-ethical-drift-to-ethical-lift-reversing-the-tide-of [https://
perma.cc/8GS2-XP53].
7. John C. Williams, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
Governance and Culture Reform Conference: Now Is the Time for Banking Reform (June 18, 2018),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/wil180618 [https://perma.cc/2YNJ-CT9B].

2020]

The Role of the Board of Financial Services Firms

725

cultures in order to seek to preemptively address root causes of misconduct
risks. The Dutch regulator, De Nederlandsche Bank, for example, has
adopted a groundbreaking approach to supervising the behavior and
culture of firms (as described in its textbook, Supervision of Behaviour
and Culture: Foundations, Practice and Future Developments).8 Also, the
New York Federal Reserve (Fed)9 and U.K. Financial Conduct Authority
have focused efforts on culture reform in the industry.
It is very clear, however, that for regulators it is primarily for firms
rather than legislators or regulators to improve culture in firms: “[C]ultural
problems are the industry’s responsibility to solve. The official sector can
monitor progress and deliver feedback and recommendations. In fact,
many individual supervisory findings are often symptoms of deeper
cultural issues at a firm. But the banks themselves must actively reform
and manage their cultures.”10 So, who is responsible within a firm for
improving its culture, and what can they do about improving culture in
their firm?
Regulators have typically focused their supervisory efforts, in
relation to culture, on the senior executive management rather than the
board,11 as they are considered to be the key influencers of a firm’s
culture.12
8. SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE, supra note 3, at 30. The DNB approach was, for
example, relied on by the Central Bank of Ireland for the purposes of its culture review of the retail
banks in Ireland. See CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, BEHAVIOUR AND CULTURE OF THE IRISH RETAIL
BANKS (2018) [hereinafter IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT], https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/
default-source/publications/corporate-reports/behaviour-and-culture-of-the-irish-retail-banks.pdf?sf
vrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/A5CL-RCXW].
9. See, e.g., Kevin J. Stiroh, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the
4th Annual Culture and Conduct Forum for the Financial Services Industry: The Complexity of
Culture Reform in Finance (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches
/2018/sti181004 [https://perma.cc/32LR-XSKL].
10. Alberto G. Musalem, Executive Vice President, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at Toward
a New Age of Responsibility in Banking and Finance: Getting the Culture and the Ethics Right: Why
Focus on Culture? (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches
/2015/mus151123 [https://perma.cc/7HPT-22HW].
11. As stated by the DNB, “[t]here are two reasons for the assumption that formal and informal
leaders function as a primary ‘lever’ for the supervision of behaviour and culture. First, because of the
impact of the board on performance. Second, because of the impact of leaders on organisational
change.” SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE, supra note 3, at 59. The DNB reference to a
“board” is to the management board or executive board. Id. at 18. Reference to a “board” in this Article
is to a single-tier board structure (composed to some extent or wholly of non-executive directors),
which is common in, for example, Anglo-Saxon countries. This is different to a two-tier board
structure, which is common in, for example, many Continental European countries; this latter structure
involves a supervisory board (composed wholly of nonexecutive directors), which sits above a
management Board (composed of the senior executive management).
12. DNB, for example, which is a globally recognized thought-leader in the area of regulatory
supervision of financial firms’ culture, noted in its book that its supervision has focused mostly on the
management board level. SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE, supra note 3, at 18; see also
IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 (stating that its review, which was prepared in
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Boards do, nevertheless, have clear legal responsibilities regarding
the culture of their firms. The 2015 Basel Corporate Governance
Principles for Banks, for example, provide as Principle 1 that “[t]he board
has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing
management’s implementation of the bank’s strategic objectives,
governance framework and corporate culture.” 13 At the European Union
(EU) level, these principles are reflected in the European Banking
Authority (EBA) Guidelines on Internal Governance.14 The question then
becomes, what role can and should the board of a financial services firm
play in improving the culture of the firm? A difficulty is that, as noted in
a November 2018 G30 report, Banking Conduct and Culture: A
Permanent Mindset Change, “[T]here is still a lack of clarity in many
organizations on how the board will champion, oversee, and monitor
conduct and culture issues . . . . ”15
In this Article, we look at the role the board is expected to play under
regulatory requirements and guidance; we then look specifically at the
failings of boards in a number of the recent “scandals.” Finally, we offer a
number of suggestions on ways in which the board can have a more
effective role in improving firms’ culture. In this latter regard, we
specifically focus on industry (rather than firm-specific) initiatives that
could enable the board to have a more effective role, particularly in light
of the setting up of the industry-funded Banking Standards Board in the
U.K. and the recent setting up of the industry-funded Irish Banking Culture
Board.16
As to the particular areas where an industry-based approach, looking
specifically at the role of boards, could assist the improvement of the
close collaboration with the DNB “focused primarily on the executive leadership team . . . due to the
importance of its members in driving effective cultures.”).
13. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS 8 (2015) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET4A-A43T].
14. EUR. BANKING AUTH., GUIDELINES ON INTERNAL GOVERNANCE UNDER DIRECTIVE
2013/36/EU, at 3 (2017), https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/216
4689/531e7d72-d8ff-4a24-a69a-c7884fa3e476/Guidelines%20on%20Internal%20Governance%20
%28EBA-GL-2017-11%29_EN.pdf?retry=1 [https://perma.cc/L5SZ-9W3F]. The EBA is mandated
by Article 74 of Directive 2013/36/EU to develop guidelines in this area. Id. Pursuant to paragraph 1
of these Guidelines, “[i]n accordance with Article 16(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, competent
authority and financial institutions must make every effort to comply with the guidelines.” Id. at 12.
15. GRP. OF THIRTY, BANKING CONDUCT AND CULTURE: A PERMANENT MINDSET CHANGE, at
xi (2018), https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/v2/publications/2018/decemb
er/Oliver_Wyman_G30_Report_on_Banking_Conduct_and_Culture.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ5M-SS
EW].
16. For the U.K. Banking Standards Board, see BANKING STANDARDS BD., https://www.
bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/P75N-VQQ2]. For the Irish Banking Culture Board,
see IRISH BANKING CULTURE BOARD, https://www.irishbankingcultureboard.ie/ [https://perma.
cc/36F9-MJG6].

2020]

The Role of the Board of Financial Services Firms

727

culture of financial services firms—and, thereby, potentially in due course,
the trustworthiness of firms—we discuss in this Article below the
following:
In the first place, the board needs to ensure that it is properly
informed—including on the basis of sufficiently reliable information from
staff and customers—of potential issues of behaviors that diverge
materially from espoused values. As is clear from the recent “scandals”
discussed further below, in many cases, boards often fail to ensure they
are properly informed of these issues, which provide an early warning
signal of misconduct risk. The development of industry norms and
possible benchmarking in relation to this failure to stay informed could be
useful in assisting this process. In this regard, one of the potential areas of
focus could usefully be in relation to customer complaints.
Secondly, constructive challenges at the board level could be
enhanced through the development of industry norms and peer review of
board engagement. Such an approach could benefit from the approach to
such reviews already developed by the DNB. As discussed further below,
“groupthink” at the board level and lack of effective challenges have been
found to be significant contributing factors to ineffective cultures in
financial services firms and the DNB has developed particular expertise in
assessing such issues.
Thirdly, boards may benefit from encouraging the industry to address
more clearly the “purpose” of a financial services firm and its wider role
in society (i.e. going beyond the aim of pursuing profits, which is an
intended outcome of any business “purpose”). Under the 2018 U.K.
Corporate Governance Code,17 for example, one of the key functions of
the board is to establish the company’s purpose. Any proper consideration
of this issue would serve to tackle a core issue of public concern, namely
that the financial services industry cannot be trusted because its mindset is
one of focusing on short-term profitability to the detriment of any
stakeholders other than shareholders.18 The idea of the “purpose” of a

17. U.K. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORP. GOVERNING CODE 2, 4–5 (2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/document-library/corporate-governance/2018/uk-corporate-governance-code
-2018 [https://perma.cc/U99R-37TV]. All companies with a premium listing of equity shares in the
UK are required under the Listing Rules to report in their annual report and accounts on how they have
applied this Code. They are required to report on the basis of a ‘comply or explain’ approach. See
Introduction to the Code; see also U.K. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON BOARD
EFFECTIVENESS (2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/document-library/corporate-governance/2018/guidan
ce-on-board-effectiveness [https://perma.cc/QR3R-HYM5]; What is the BSB?, supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., Andrew Bailey, Chief Exec. Fin. Conduct Auth., Speech at the Launch of St.
Mary’s University School of Business: Trust and Ethics—A Regulator’s Perspective (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/andrew-bailey-trust-ethics-regulators-perspective
[https://
perma.cc/H7Q8-A9W5].
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corporation in society is one of increasing public debate19 and boards of
financial services firms could assist in improving trust in the industry by
encouraging constructive engagement on this issue.
The particular benefit of developing industry-wide standards,
benchmarking, and peer-pressure around these issues is that, as noted by
the DNB, “in essence, peer pressure regulates behaviour.”20
I. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY A FIRM’S “CULTURE”?
While most financial services firms will likely have in place detailed
values statements, codes of conduct, and various processes and procedures
that are intended to ensure that all employees of the firm behave in
accordance with specified standards of behavior, the “way things get done
around here” will likely be more complex than can be described in written
documents and can often diverge from the high-level general expectations
set out in the firm’s documentation.
Employees are more likely to look to their peers and “tone from the
top” than to written manuals of the firm for guidance on what behaviors
are acceptable within the firm. As noted above, “in essence, peer pressure
regulates behaviour.”21 Additionally, “[f]or employees, organisational
culture is the social glue that holds the organisation together by providing
appropriate standards for the ways employees should behave. As a
consequence, culture reduces employees’ uncertainty and anxiety about
appropriate and expected behaviours.”22
An important theoretical framework for identifying and assessing
organizational culture has been provided by the organizational
psychologist Edgar Schein.23 The DNB’s model for assessing firms’
culture is strongly based on Schein’s conceptual model.24
According to Schein, culture exists simultaneously on three different
levels: (1) on the surface are artifacts; (2) under the surface are espoused
values and beliefs; and (3) at the core are basic assumptions. The DNB
uses the metaphor of an iceberg to describe these three levels because only
the first layer is directly observable.

19. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Remoralization of the Market, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/opinion/market-morality.html?action=click&module=Opinion
&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/2RKE-82PK].
20. IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 45.
23. See generally EDGAR H. SCHEIN WITH PETER SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
LEADERSHIP (5th ed. 2017).
24. IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8, at 46.
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The first level, the artifacts of a firm, are the “visible and feelable”
phenomena in a firm: the “phenomena that you would see, hear and feel
when you encounter a new group with an unfamiliar culture.”25
For present purposes, these artifacts include, for example, the formal
governance structure of a financial services firm, its values statement, its
code of conduct, and its formal policies relating to financial incentives for
staff, diversity, and inclusion. These artifacts also include observable
behaviors. The DNB’s supervisory approach in relation to this layer of the
iceberg involves reviewing the behaviors of firms’ senior leadership teams
in relation to decisionmaking, leadership, and communication.
Clearly, the board has the key role in approving many of these
“artifacts,” including those relating to, for example, a firm’s statement of
its values and its code of conduct.26
The second level of culture, espoused values and beliefs, are the
consciously understood and spoken of assumptions of the group, or firm,
as to their values and beliefs; they are “explicitly articulated because they
serve the normative or moral function of guiding members of the group as
to how to deal with certain key situations as well as in training new
members how to behave.”27
For the DNB, this layer of its iceberg metaphor involves assessing
group dynamics, in particular at the level of the senior leaders. In its
assessments of firms, the DNB looks at the “atmosphere” of interactions
within groups, in particular the senior leadership team (management board
in a two-tier board structure). It looks at issues such as: Is there an
atmosphere where people can address unwanted or “bad” behavior? Is
there an atmosphere of co-operation or competition, perhaps infighting? Is
there a basis of mutual trust within a (management) board, between the
senior management and the board, or does mistrust dominate in the
working relationship?28
Boardroom dynamics can be assessed at this level of the “iceberg”
and can have an important impact on a firm’s “tone from the top,” and
hence, overall culture.29
Assessing these two levels, however, may not be sufficient. The third
level, relating to taken-for-granted underlying basic assumptions, is a key
level. These are assumptions about behavior, where members of a group

25. SCHEIN, supra note 23, at 17.
26. See, e.g., EURO. BANKING AUTH., supra note 14, at 34 (stating that the board “should be
responsible for setting and communicating the institution’s core values and expectations”).
27. SCHEIN, supra note 23, at 20.
28. IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
29. Id. at 59–60.
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holding these assumptions may find behavior based on any other premise
“inconceivable.”30 The DNB has described this layer as the “mindset.”31
According to Schein, where a leader identifies a culture involving
widespread discrepancies between desired behaviors and observed
behaviors, in order to achieve culture change the leader will need to “locate
the cultural DNA and change some of that,”32 or in other words, address
culture issues at the level of taken-for-granted underlying basic
assumptions and not merely at the level of artifacts or espoused values and
beliefs.33
Based on Schein, the DNB also notes that a detailed understanding
of all three layers is necessary in order to understand organizational culture
and to be able to target changes.34
Schein’s model is helpful for the purposes of considering what
aspects of a culture can be influenced or managed by a board. We rely on
Schein’s model for the purposes of our discussion of suggestions on this
issue in Part VI below—particularly, the issue of considering the purpose
of a firm.
II. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTATIONS ON BOARDS TO
APPROVE AND OVERSEE CORPORATE CULTURE
As noted above, the 2015 Basel Corporate Governance Principles for
Banks provide that the board of a bank has the overall responsibility for
the bank, including approving and overseeing corporate culture.35 These
Principles note that “a fundamental component of good governance is a
corporate culture of reinforcing appropriate norms for responsible and
ethical behaviour” and state that, in order to promote a sound corporate
culture, the board should reinforce the “tone from the top” by:
 Setting and adhering to corporate values that create expectations
that all business should be conducted in a legal and ethical
manner, and overseeing the adherence to such values by senior
management and other employees;

30. SCHEIN, supra note 23, at 22.
31. IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8, at 51.
32. SCHEIN, supra note 23, at 27.
33. As noted by the DNB, “challenging behaviour and culture [by a supervisor] means
questioning underlying beliefs and threatening stability and security. These kinds of changes in
organisations often involve an emotional and confusing process. Not only for the financial
organisation’s leaders and managers but also for the supervisors who address issues concerning
behavioural and cultural change. All in all, this requires perseverance.” IRISH BANKING CULTURE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 95.
34. Id. at 52.
35. GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 8.
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Promoting risk awareness within a strong risk culture, conveying
the board’s expectation that it does not support excessive risktaking, and that all employees are responsible for helping the
bank operate within the established risk appetite and risk limits;
 Confirming that appropriate steps have been or are being taken
to communicate throughout the bank the corporate values,
professional standards, or codes of conduct it sets, together with
supporting policies; and
 Confirming that employees, including senior management, are
aware that appropriate disciplinary or other actions will follow
unacceptable behaviours and transgressions.36
The Basel Corporate Governance Principles also provide that an
appropriate code of conduct should be put in place, and that Boards should
have oversight of the whistleblowing policy mechanism and of ensuring
that senior management addresses legitimate issues that are raised.
Additionally, the board should oversee and approve how, and by whom,
legitimate material concerns should be investigated and addressed by an
objective, independent internal or external body—senior management, the
board itself, or both.37 At the EU level, these principles are reflected in the
European Banking Authority (EBA) Guidelines on Internal Governance.38
More recently, the 2018 U.K. Corporate Governance Code,39 which
came into force in January 2019, provides that: “The board should
establish the company’s purpose, values and strategy, and satisfy itself that
these and its culture are aligned. All directors must act with integrity, lead
by example, and promote the desired culture.”40 In addition,
The board should assess and monitor culture. Where it is not satisfied
that policy, practices or behaviour throughout the business are
aligned with the company’s purpose, values and strategy, it should
seek assurance that management has taken corrective action. The

36. Id. at 9.
37. Id. at 9–10.
38. EURO. BANKING AUTH., supra note 14, at 12. The EBA is mandated by Article 74 of
Directive 2013/36/EU to develop guidelines in this area. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of these guidelines,
“[i]n accordance with Article 16(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, competent authority and
financial institutions must make every effort to comply with the guidelines.” Id.
39. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNING CODE 2 (2018), https://www.
frc.org.uk/document-library/corporate-governance/2018/uk-corporate-governance-code-2018 [https:
//perma.cc/U99R-37TV]. All companies with a Premium Listing of equity shares in the UK are
required under the Listing Rules to report in their annual report and accounts on how they have applied
this Code. They are required to report on the basis of a “comply or explain” approach. Id.; see also
GUIDANCE ON BOARD EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17.
40. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 39, at 4.
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annual report should explain the board’s activities and any action
taken.41

Whilst the legal responsibility on boards to approve and oversee an
appropriate culture is clear, the practical difficulties faced by boards must
also be recognized. As noted in an important 2015 G30 report setting out
recommendations for culture change in the industry:
Most Boards struggle in addressing culture. Difficulty defining the
underlying concepts, a lack of clear metrics, diffuse responsibilities
across the Executive team, a lack of sufficient time to consider
cultural issues properly, and lack of visibility on key cultural issues
are cited as challenges to improving the Board’s oversight and
engagement on conduct and values.42

III. HIGH-PROFILE RECENT EXAMPLES OF BOARD FAILURES
A number of reports into the failings of banks in the run-up to the
financial crisis in 2007–2008, highlighted failures of the boards,
particularly in terms of failures to challenge the executive effectively. The
2009 Walker Review, which reported at the behest of the U.K. Prime
Minister on corporate governance in the U.K. banking industry and made
recommendations for reform, emphasized that “[t]he most critical need is
for an environment in which effective challenge of the executive is
expected and achieved in the boardroom before decisions are taken on
major risk and strategic issues.” 43 More generally, as noted in the abovementioned 2015 G30 report,
In the lead-up to the 2008–2009 financial crisis, Boards in certain
banks allowed their management to take decisions and actions that
ultimately led to poor outcomes for the firms’ employees, customers,
shareholders, and the wider economy. Boards had neither sufficient
expertise nor the ability to effectively challenge management
strategies. And Board decisions suffered from self-reinforcing
groupthink and herd behavior.44

41. Id.
42. GRP. OF THIRTY, BANKING CONDUCT AND CULTURE: A CALL FOR SUSTAINED AND
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 31 (2015), https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Bank
ingConductandCulture.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RRC-SY5Q].
43. DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2009), https://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/8HPR-8PPD].
44. GRP. OF THIRTY, supra note 42, at 19.
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The April 2013 Salz review45 of the business practices of Barclays
PLC prior to the financial crisis, also provides useful insights into the
governance and culture problems that gave rise to excessive risk-taking
and ethical issues. With regard specifically to the role of the board, the
report notes:
The board sets the tone from the top of the organisation, and must
carry ultimate responsibility for its values, culture and business
practices. With the benefit of hindsight, we believe that the Barclays
Board did not give sufficient attention to this area. We also believe
the Board found it difficult at times to penetrate into what was a large,
complex organisation. It was significantly stretched in coping with
the many issues that arose in the financial crisis – the Board met on
30 occasions in 2008 (at times by conference call) and 27 times in
2009 – and many of the events that have raised questions about
culture and business practices only clearly emerged after the
beginning of the financial crisis.
One of the principal roles of the Board is to provide challenge to
management. Whether it is successful is influenced by a number of
factors, including the composition of the Board, the skills of the
Chairman, Board members’ understanding of the Group’s businesses,
the time they have to give, the openness of the executive directors
and the information available to the Board. Barclays has made
progress in improving the specialist financial experience on the
Board, as well as its diversity, but there is more to be done.46

The findings of the U.K. Parliamentary Commission into banking
standards, in its June 2013 report Changing Banking for Good,47 were
starker.
Banks whose board-level governance arrangements could be
described on paper as approximating to best practice have run into
serious governance problems. There were frequently several
common elements to bank governance failures. Some CEOs were
overly dominant, which the Board as a whole failed to control.
45. See generally ANTHONY SALZ, SALZ REVIEW: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BARCLAYS’
BUSINESS PRACTICES (2013) [hereinafter SALZ REVIEW], https://online.wsj.com/public/resou
rces/documents/SalzReview04032013.pdf[https://perma.cc/5HLU-7BCT].
46. Id. at 8.
47. HOUSE OF LORDS & HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING
STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, VOL. 1, 2013, HC 175-I, at 4 (UK), https://www
.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VAM5-NU3W]. The terms of reference of this Parliamentary Commission state that it is to “consider
and report on professional standards and culture of the UK banking sector, taking account of regulatory
and competition investigations into the LIBOR rate-setting process, lessons to be learned about
corporate governance, transparency and conflicts of interest, and their implications for regulation and
for Government policy and to make recommendations for legislative and other action.” Id.
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Chairmen proved weak; often they were too close to, and became
cheerleaders for, the CEO. NEDs provided insufficient scrutiny of,
or challenge to, the executive, and were too often advocates for
expansion rather than cautioning of the risks involved. There was
insufficient wider banking experience among NEDs and the
resources available to them were inadequate. Central functions,
including risk and control, had insufficient capability and status to
perform their functions and were often regarded as an impediment to
the business, rather than essential to its long-term success.48

The U.K. Parliamentary Commission also identified the importance
of individual accountability at the highest levels.
Too many bankers, especially at the most senior levels, have operated
in an environment with insufficient personal responsibility. Top
bankers dodged accountability for failings on their watch by claiming
ignorance or hiding behind collective decision-making. They then
faced little realistic prospect of financial penalties or more serious
sanctions commensurate with the severity of the failures with which
they were associated. Individual incentives have not been consistent
with high collective standards, often the opposite.49

In Ireland, the 2011 Nyberg Commission of Investigation into the
Banking Sector noted, with regard to the responsibilities of the Board:
“Banks’ management and boards embraced a lending sales culture at the
expense of prudence and risk management.50 This view then spread down
through the ranks, partly through the effects of volume targets and bonus
systems and partly through indoctrination, causing the massive run-up in
risky assets.”51 More recently, in a July 2018 report on the culture of the
five retail banks in Ireland,52 the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) noted that
Irish banks have a way to go in developing a customer-focused culture; as
to the role of boards, the CBI noted that more needs to be done to improve
the effectiveness of challenges at the board level.53
Furthermore, in Australia, the April 2018 report by the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) into the Commonwealth Bank of
Australia (CBA), the largest financial institution in Australia, provides

48. Id. at 41.
49. Id. at 8.
50. See generally COMM’N OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE BANKING SECTOR IN IRELAND,
MISJUDGING RISK: CAUSES OF THE SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS IN IRELAND 96 (2011), https://
www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Documents/Misjuding%20Risk%20-%20Causes%20of%20the%20
Systemic%20Banking%20Crisis%20in%20Ireland.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GCL-8HU7].
51. Id. at 96.
52. IRISH BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8.
53. Id. at 30.
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some interesting insights into the role of the board and board failings. 54
This report, following a number of misconduct issues at the bank, found
that there were significant shortcomings in governance and management
of nonfinancial risk. In particular, it found that the board “did not
demonstrate rigour of oversight and challenge to CBA management” or
“have the right balance of both summarised and detailed reporting” in
relation to non-financial risks.55 With regard to customers, CBA’s board
focused on aggregate customer satisfaction survey results (such as Net
Promoter Scores, discussed further below) and alarm bells from the
treatment of aggrieved customers “did not sound loudly.”56 “Although
CBA has drawn comfort from strong customer satisfaction metrics, which
reflect an aggregated view of customer sentiment, it has missed the tail
where customer issues reside.”57
More recently, in February 2019, the Australian Royal Commission
report58 into misconduct in the Australian financial services industry was
published. This report was highly critical of the extent of misconduct in
the financial services industry in Australia and noted that primary
responsibility lies with the entities and “those who managed and controlled
those entities: their boards and senior management.”59
A. Board “Blind Spots”: Wells Fargo
The recent Wells Fargo scandal is an example of a board “blind
spot,” in that the commercial success of a particular business model
blinded it to the underlying conduct risks of the model. Specifically, it
appears that the Board failed to consider/look for information on whether
the successful business model was in line with the stated values of the firm.
Essentially, the Community Bank business of Wells Fargo in the
U.S. incentivized/pressured its staff to cross-sell products to existing
clients—in particular to open new bank accounts and take on new
services.60 The pressures on sales staff to meet overly-ambitious sales
54. JOHN LAKER ET AL., AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., PRUDENTIAL INQUIRY INTO
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA (2018), https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default
/files/CBA-Prudential-Inquiry_Final-Report_30042018.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYQ6-L27D].
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 92.
58. 1 ROYAL COMMISSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, FINAL REPORT (2019) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION FINAL
REPORT], https://www.royalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-02/fsrc-volume-1-final-repo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/D63J-8MAE].
59. Id. at 4.
60. The then-Wells Fargo Chairman and CEO, John Stumpf, regularly used the infamous mantra
“eight is great” to motivate staff to get customers to take eight of the company’s products. Maggie
McGrath, How the Wells Fargo Phony Account Scandal Sunk, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2016),
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targets resulted in them taking short cuts or engaging in fraudulent activity
to meet their sales targets. In 2016, Wells Fargo was fined $185 million
by U.S. regulators for these activities.61 Additionally, as noted in an
October 2018 settlement agreement between Wells Fargo and the Attorney
General for the State of New York, Wells Fargo was fined $65 million.
As a result of its cross-sell driven sales culture, certain Wells Fargo
employees engaged in the following misconduct without customer
knowledge or consent: opened deposit accounts; transferred funds
from customers’ authorized accounts in order to temporarily fund
unauthorized accounts; used email addresses not belonging to
customers to enroll customers in on-line banking services; requested
debit cards and created personal identification numbers (PINs) in
order to activate them; and submitted applications for and obtained
credit cards.62

The mis-selling affected approximately 3.5 million customer
accounts.63 In July 2017, Wells Fargo announced that, following a review,
it would provide a total of $2.8 million in refunds and credits due to
customers on top of $3.3 million previously refunded.64
In June 2018, Wells Fargo settled a class action lawsuit in California
relating to these practices for $142 million.65 Wells Fargo has also been
forced to pay compensation to former employees of the firm who lost their
jobs as a result of whistleblowing about the sales practices—in one case
the compensation amounted to $5.4 million.66
In testimony to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, John Stumpf,
the Chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo during the period in question,
famously stated that what had happened at the bank went against “our

https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2016/09/23/the-9-most-important-things-you-need-toknow-about-the-well-fargo-fiasco/#74a6dbf3bdc4 [https://perma.cc/5VCK-67T7].
61. See Wells Fargo Bank, CFBP No. 2016-CFBP-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016) (consent order).
62. Settlement Agreement at 3, In the Matter of Wells Fargo & Company, No. 18-121 (Oct. 18,
2018).
63. See Wayne Thompson, Wells Fargo Expands Remediation Plans After Additional Analysis,
WELLS FARGO (Aug. 31, 2017), https://stories.wf.com/wells-fargo-remediation-plans/ [https://perma.
cc/C7WL-QW9V].
64. Id.
65. Ben Lane, Court Finally Approves Wells Fargo’s $142 Million Fake Account Class Action
Settlement, HOUSINGWIRE (June 15, 2018), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/43698-courtfinally-approves-wells-fargos-142-million-fake-account-class-action-settlement [https://perma.cc/3C
5G-EKBH].
66. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Orders Wells Fargo to Reinstate SoCal
Whistleblower; Pay $577K in Back Wages, Damages, Attorneys’ Fees (July 21, 2017), https://www.
osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region9/07212017 [https://perma.cc/B395-KGH9].
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values, ethics and culture and runs counter to our business strategy.”67 In
October 2016, he resigned from Wells Fargo.68
On February 2, 2018, the U.S. Federal Reserve issued a letter69 to
Mr. Stumpf, in his capacity as then Chair of the Board of Wells Fargo,
noting that Wells Fargo pursued sales strategies that “motivated
compliance violations and improper practices”70 and that Mr. Stumpf was
aware of sales practices issues but failed to investigate them or inform the
Board about them in a timely manner.71 The U.S. Federal Reserve letter
concluded by stating, “[Y]our performance in addressing these problems
is an example of ineffective oversight that is not consistent with the
Federal Reserve’s expectations for a firm of [Wells Fargo’s] size and
scope of operations.”72
In April 2017, Wells Fargo published a report73 on the mis-selling
scandal, which was commissioned by independent directors of the Board
of Wells Fargo. This report gives some useful insights into the background
of the mis-selling. The principal findings of this report included
The root cause of sales practice failures was the distortion of the
Community Bank’s sales culture and performance management
system, which, when combined with aggressive sales management,
created pressure on employees to sell unwanted or unneeded products
to customers and, in some cases, to open unauthorized accounts.
Wells Fargo’s decentralized corporate structure gave too much
autonomy to the Community Bank’s senior leadership, who were
unwilling to change the sales model or even recognize it as the root
cause of the problem. Community Bank leadership resisted and
impeded outside scrutiny or oversight and, when forced to report,
minimized the scale and nature of the problem.74

67. Matt Egan & Chris Isidore, Wells Fargo CEO Denies Orchestrated Fraud in Accounts
Scandal, CNN (Sept. 22, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/20/news/companies/wells-fargo-ceoapology/index.html?iid=hp-stack-dom [https://perma.cc/HA77-J8D5].
68. Zeke Faux, Laura J. Keller & Jennifer Surane, Wells Fargo CEO Stumpf Quits in Fallout
from Fake Accounts, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201610-12/wells-fargo-ceo-stumpf-steps-down-in-fallout-from-fake-accounts (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
69. See Letter from Michael S. Gibson, Dir., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to John
Stumpf, Chair of Bd. Of Dirs., Wells Fargo & Co. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20180202a4.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GF9-QY52].
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id. at 1–2.
72. Id. at 2.
73. INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO. & SHERMAN & STERLING LLP, SALES
PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT (2017) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION REPORT], https://www08
.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/3F8Y-AUTW].
74. Id. at Overview of the Report.
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The report found that sales practice violations were identified as far
back as 2002—when the Community Bank took steps to address it,
including through the creation of a sales integrity task force.75 The volume
of sale practice violations steadily increased over time.76 Carrie Tolstedt
took over as CEO of Community Bank in 2007.77 Her aggressive sales
approach was fully supported by Wells Fargo CEO, John Stumpf, who
considered her to be the “best banker in America.”78
It appears that, at least prior to the October 2013 and December 2013,
articles in the Los Angeles Times about the sales practices showed that the
practices were not considered to be a material issue within Wells Fargo.79
This was despite the fact that between 2011 and 2016, over 5,300 Wells
Fargo employees were fired for sales practice violations80—indeed, Mr.
Stumpf concluded as late as May 2015 that the fact that around 1,000
employees per year were fired because of sales practice violations, meant
“[t]his is not systemic.”81 Also, as far back as 2004, an Internal
Investigations report that went to the Chief Auditor of Wells Fargo found
that staff “feel they cannot make sales goals without gaming the system.
The incentive to cheat is based on the fear of losing their jobs for not
meeting performance expectations” and that this gave rise to ethical issues
and reputational risks for Wells Fargo.82
Importantly, “The Community Bank identified itself as a sales
organization, like a department or retail stores, rather than a serviceoriented financial institution. This provided justification for a relentless
focus on sales, abbreviated training and high employee turnover.”83
Indeed, from 2011 to 2015, the average annual staff turnover was 30%,
reaching 41% for the twelve-month period to October 2012.84
Additionally, the April 2017 report of the independent directors found that
This underreaction to sales practice issues resulted in part from the
incorrect belief, extending well into 2015, that improper practices did
not cause any “customer harm”; and “customer harm” itself was
narrowly construed to mean only financial harm such as fees and
penalties. This flawed perspective made it easy to undervalue the risk
to Wells Fargo’s brand and reputation arising from the misuse of
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 19.
78. Id. at 56.
79. See id. at 32.
80. Id. at 16.
81. Id. at 55–56.
82. Id. at 89.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 27–28.

2020]

The Role of the Board of Financial Services Firms

739

customer information and the breaches of trust occasioned by
improper sales practices.85

More generally, an important factor was that CEO John Stumpf was
Wells Fargo’s principal proponent of the cross-sell and general sales
culture. Also, he “was not perceived within Wells Fargo as someone who
wanted to hear bad news or deal with conflict.”86
As to the role of the Board, the report found that the Board’s actions
could have been improved in three respects: (1) it should have centralized
the risk function sooner than it actually did—in 2016; (2) from 2014, when
it was informed of the sales practices as a noteworthy risk, it should have
insisted on more detailed and concrete plans from the various reporting
functions; and (3) it should have been more forceful in pushing Mr. Stumpf
to remove Carrie Tolstedt as CEO of the Community Bank, at least by
October 2015.87
The report was widely criticized in the press when it was published88
because it appeared to be overly generous to the Wells Fargo Board. In
particular, the report notes that “[t]here was a growing conflict over time
in the Community Bank between Wells Fargo’s Vision & Values and the
Community Bank’s emphasis on sales goals”89—but the report fails to
consider this central question in any meaningful way and the Board’s
responsibility for addressing it. This growing conflict was evident from
whistle-blower reports that could and should have been considered by the
Wells Fargo Board. For example, an April 2017 report by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency90 noted that by 2010, there had been about
700 whistle-blower complaints of gaming of the incentive plans91—this
volume of whistle-blower complaints alone should have been a “red flag”
to the Board. Furthermore, the Wells Fargo Board was, at best, remarkably
incurious about the high volume of staff turnover at the Community Bank,
along with the nature and volume of firings for sales practice violations
and the reasons for these firings. Ultimately, the Board failed to attach

85. Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 53–54.
87. Id. at 16–17.
88. See Eleanor Bloxham, Here’s How Wells Fargo’s Board of Directors Just Failed Customers,
FORTUNE (Apr. 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/14/wells-fargo-fake-accounts-2/ [https://
perma.cc/K9DP-QQK8].
89. INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 73, at 4.
90. See generally OFFICE OF ENTER. GOVERNANCE AND THE OMBUDSMAN, ENTERPRISE
GOVERNANCE SUPERVISION: LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT
WELLS FARGO (2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/banker-educati
on/files/pub-wells-fargo-supervision-lessons-learned.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6KS-FEKK] (reviewing
the supervision of Wells Fargo sales practices).
91. Id. at 5.
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adequate importance to ensuring that the culture of Wells Fargo lived up
to the espoused values of the firm.
B. Board “Blind Spots”: U.K. Payment Protection Insurance (PPI)
The U.K. PPI issue provides a useful example of a board blind spot
of focusing on the commercial benefits of the high profitability of a
product, while ignoring the potential conduct risks inherent in such high
profitability.
PPI policies are intended to assist borrowers in loan repayment where
they are otherwise unable to do so because of a specified event (e.g., loss
of job or illness). In the U.K., they were typically offered by banks and
other credit providers when providing credit to consumers (e.g., for a
mortgage or unsecured loan).
PPI was a very lucrative business for the banks in the U.K.. For
example, Barclays Bank PPI comprised between 32% and 42% of its U.K.
retail and business bank pre-tax profit between 2001 and 2005, when
almost 70% of borrowers taking some loan products also bought a policy.
Additionally, between 2002 and 2012, Barclays’ total revenues from PPI,
net of claims, and provisions for alleged mis-selling amounted to an
estimated £940 million.92
A 2005 Citizens Advice report described the PPI business in the U.K.
(with its estimated 20 million policies in force and annual gross premiums
in excess of £5 billion) as a “protection racket.”93 Indeed, concerns about
mis-selling of PPI had been in the public domain in the U.K. since at least
1998.94 The mis-selling involved various practices such as selling PPI to
customers who were not eligible to claim on the policy; high-pressure sales
tactics, giving people the impression that they had to take out PPI in order
to get a loan; and various exclusions which significantly limited the scope
of the potential benefits sales to people with no incomes to protect. In
2009, the U.K. Financial Services Authority estimated that PPI mis-selling
may have affected around three million people in the U.K. since the
1990s.95
92. SALZ REVIEW, supra note 45, at 56–57.
93. PETER TUTTON & FRANCESCA HOPWOOD ROAD, PROTECTION RACKET: CAB EVIDENCE ON
THE COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE 1 (2005), https://www.citizens
advice.org.uk/Global/Migrated_Documents/corporate/protection-racket-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y
674-DT3M]; see also Graeme Wearden, How the PPI Scandal Unfolded, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/may/05/how-ppi-scandal-unfolded [https://perma.cc/78
QP-PGAX].
94. Richard Evans, Timeline: How the PPI Scandal Unfolded, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/incomeprotection/8681344/Timeline
-how-the-PPI-scandal-unfolded.html [https://perma.cc/KYG8-9NGD].
95. SALZ REVIEW, supra note 45, at 56.
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The PPI market was investigated by the U.K. Competition
Commission.96 Its 2009 inquiry report noted that there was considerable
customer confusion about the features and benefits of PPI97—there was
evidence of consumers being under the impression that their credit
application was more likely to be successful if they also bought PPI.98
Additionally, PPI customers were more likely to earn below the national
average wage or come from more disadvantaged socio-economic sections
of society.99 The Competition Commission’s 2011 market investigation
order imposed various restrictions on future selling of PPI.100 As of
September 2019, financial services firms in the U.K. have refunded over
£36.4 billion to customers affected by the PPI mis-selling in the U.K..101
As to the role of the boards of firms involved in the PPI scandal, it
appears from the Competition Commission investigation report that PPI
was discussed at the board level, but the focus of the discussion was on its
profitability. The Salz Review found that the Barclay Bank Group
Executive Committee reviewed PPI in 2005; it found that PPI was “highly
profitable” and was aware that “there were potential concerns relating to
the fairness of single premium policies, policies sold where customers
could not make claims and sales practices that were ‘not customer
friendly’ or ‘high pressure.’”102 The Salz Review criticized Barclays Bank,
stating that “the high profitability of PPI should have raised questions as
to whether this was consistent with Barclays’ obligations to customers,” it
was “slow to address control failures” and “[t]he culture of the bank had
developed into one which at times valued meeting financial targets more
than meeting customer needs.”103 These are all issues that could and should
have been addressed at an early stage at the board level. It is likely that the
conclusions of the Salz Review regarding PPI mis-selling could equally
apply to the other U.K. banks and other financial institutions that mis-sold
PPI in the U.K..

96. See COMPETITION COMM’N, MARKET INVESTIGATION INTO PAYMENT PROTECTION
INSURANCE (2009), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402202346/http://www.com
petition-commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-inquiry/rep_pub/reports/20
09/fulltext/542.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC9T-2GBV].
97. Id. at 107.
98. Id. at 34–35.
99. Id. at 3.
100. See generally COMPETITION COMM’N, PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE MARKET
INVESTIGATION ORDER 2011, at 1 (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/330608/ppi_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGQ3-4M6G].
101. Monthly PPI Refunds and Compensation, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.fca.org.uk/data/monthly-ppi-refunds-and-compensation
[https://perma.cc/H7M6-GX
V6].
102. SALZ REVIEW, supra note 45, at 57.
103. Id. at 58.
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C. Board “Blind Spots”: Danske Bank
The recent Danske Bank scandal is an example of a board blind spot:
uncritical acceptance of indications from a second line of defense function
(compliance, in this case) that outstanding potential conduct risk concerns
relating to anti-money laundering were being ineffectively addressed
within the bank.
Danske Bank, the largest financial institution in Denmark,
established a presence in Estonia when it acquired Sampo Bank together
with its Estonian branch in 2007.104
The Estonian branch had a specific “Non-Resident Portfolio” of nonresident clients from 2007 to 2015 (when the non-resident accounts were
closed). There had been around 10,000 non-resident customers in this
Portfolio,105 many from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.106 During the
period 2007–2015, there was a flow of funds amounting to approximately
€200 billion from external parties to these non-resident bank accounts and
on to external third parties.107
Concerns about the possible use of these non-resident accounts for
money laundering emerged from 2007. This scandal was reported on by a
Danish law firm for the Danske Bank Board in September 2018, sometime
after the issue became the subject of significant public comment, stating
that108
In 2007, shortly after completing the acquisition of Sampo Bank,
Danske Bank had a real opportunity to conclude that the NonResident Portfolio involved suspicious activity not caught by AML
procedures at Sampo Pank in Estonia. In 2007, the Estonian FSA
came out with a critical inspection report, and at the same time
Danske Bank at Group level received specific information from the
Russian Central Bank, through the Danish FSA. This information
pointed to possible ‘tax and custom payments evasion’ and ‘criminal
activity in its pure form, including money laundering’, estimated at

104. BRUUN & HJEJLE, REPORT ON THE NON-RESIDENT PORTFOLIO AT DANSKE BANK’S
ESTONIAN BRANCH 3 (2018), https://danskebank.com/-/media/danske-bank-com/file-cloud/2018
/9/report-on-the-non-resident-portfolio-at-danske-banks-estonian-branch.pdf?rev=56b16dfddae9448
0bb8cdcaebeaddc9b&hash=B7D825F2639326A3BBBC7D524C5E341E [https://perma.cc/NN2DZLV2].
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. at 3, 5.
107. Id. at 6.
108. See generally Pamela Barbaglia & Teis Jensen, Danske Bank Money Laundering ‘Giga
Scandal’ Spreads to Britain, INDEPENDENT.IE (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.independent.ie/
business/world/danske-bank-money-laundering-giga-scandal-spreads-to-britain-37340762.html
[https://perma.cc/J4T6-6MBR] (EU Commissioner Vestager referred to it as a “giga scandal”).
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‘billions of rubles monthly’. However, Danske Bank missed this first
real opportunity.109

In 2007, the above letter from the Russian Central Bank was on the
agenda of a Danske Bank Board meeting and information was given to the
effect that the matter would be investigated internally.110 Additionally, a
2007 anti-money laundering inspection by the Estonian regulator found
that the Estonian branch of Danske Bank did not fully comply with
relevant legal requirements.111
A further red flag that should have been considered by the Board of
Danske Bank at the time was that, whereas the Estonian branch’s share of
total assets of the Danske Bank group was minuscule, at 0.5%, at its height
in 2011, it represented only 10.7% of the group’s entire profits before
tax.112
The issue became a matter of public concern following the
publication of news reports in March 2017 of a “Russian Laundromat”
money laundering operation in which the Danske Bank entity featured
prominently.113 News stories about an “Azerbaijani Laundromat” emerged
subsequently in 2017.114
The report to the Danske Bank Board concluded that neither the
Danske Bank group CEO nor Board had breached their respective legal
obligations.
[I]t is clear that problems were reported to the Board of Directors and
the Audit Committee, and it is equally clear that such reporting was
accompanied by assurances that problems were being dealt with and
mitigation was ongoing. This information came from within the bank
where the severity of the situation and the risks facing the bank had
not been comprehended, and this affected the reporting. In hindsight,
the question may be raised whether the Board of Directors or the
Audit Committee could reasonably have done more. This, however,
would not, in our view, form sufficient basis for legal criticism when
taking into account the information available combined with the
nature and extent of the responsibilities of the Board of Directors.115

As with the above-mentioned report, commissioned by the Board of
Wells Fargo,116 the conclusions of this report, which was commissioned
by the Board of Danske Bank, seem somewhat narrowly focused and
109. BRUUN & HJEJLE, supra note 104, at 8.
110. See id. at 80.
111. Id. at 40.
112. Id. at 26.
113. Id. at 73–74.
114. Id. at 76.
115. Id. at 81.
116. INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 73.
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generous to the Board and CEO in light of the above information that was
available to it.
In any event, shortly after the publication of this report, the then CEO
resigned and the chairman was removed at the behest of the bank’s largest
shareholder in order to “strengthen the bank’s ability to address its culture,
compliance program and engagement with regulators.”117 Various national
investigations into the issues are on-going.118
IV. ENHANCING BOARD EFFECTIVENESS IN ITS ROLE OF OVERSEEING A
FIRM’S CULTURE—ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
Quite apart from board failures in addressing key structural issues
that give rise to conduct risk issues, such as lack of diversity and distorted
financial incentives—having the effect of incentivizing staff not to take
adequate account of customer interests—the recent reports and highprofile cases outlined in the previous section have highlighted significant
further failings of boards, particularly those discussed below.
A. Lack of Adequate Data
Boards have often failed to attach sufficient importance to ensuring
that they receive sufficiently useful and adequate data that would give
them insight into whether there is a material divergence between the firm’s
espoused values and how it actually behaves in practice. Such data would
provide potentially important early-warning signals to the board of
possible issues around, for example, excessive risk-taking and unethical
conduct, illegal conduct, or both. This was one of the areas where the
recent Australian Royal Commission report was particularly critical of
financial institutions, noting that “too often, boards did not get the right
information about emerging non-financial risks; did not do enough to seek
further or better information where what they had was clearly deficient;
and did not do enough with the information they had to oversee and
challenge management’s approach to these risks.”119 The Royal
Commission report emphasized that boards must have the right
information in order to discharge their functions:
When I refer to boards having the right information, I am not
referring to boards having more information. As I noted earlier, it is
117. Maersk Family Ousts Danske Bank Chairman After Scandal, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/financial-services/maersk-family-ousts-danske-bank-chairmanafter-scandal-1.3688352 [https://perma.cc/4QBW-GMQZ].
118. See Danske Bank Faces US Investigation into Money Laundering, GUARDIAN TIMES (Oct.
4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/04/danske-bank-faces-us-investigation-intomoney-laundering [https://perma.cc/WLE3-GDFR].
119. ROYAL COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 395.
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the quality, not the quantity, of information that must increase. Often,
improving the quality of information given to boards will require
giving directors less material and more information.
I do not pretend to be able to offer any single answer to how
boards can ensure that they receive the right information. But boards
and management must keep considering how to present information
about the right issues, in the right way.120

Similarly, in a recent U.S. report on corporate governance it was
noted that “if the board relies solely on management reports, the risk is
that information may be incomplete, filtered, or edited, even in good-faith
ways. The general name for this problem is ‘asymmetric information,’ and
this imbalance can weaken the board’s ability to oversee the corporation
properly.”121 In this regard, whilst a board might take some comfort from
knowing that adequate processes and procedures are in place to enable and
facilitate speaking up within the firm, this is of relatively little use in
practice if staff within the firm do not actually feel comfortable speaking
up about sensitive matters and the board remains ill-informed about
potential issues.
Additionally, when assessing customer-related data, boards can often
focus on data that will not give them a sufficient insight into customer
outcomes. For example, often boards rely on data relating to complaints
made by customers, although many poor customer outcomes may not give
rise to customer complaints until long after the customer harm has arisen,
if at all. Also, a customer-related metric commonly used by boards is the
Net Promoter Score. As noted in a recent report by the New Zealand
financial services regulator:
Many banks used a survey tool known as “Net Promoter Score”,
which gauges customer loyalty. These surveys are typically done
immediately after the customer interacts with the bank. However, the
harm caused by poor product design or inappropriate sales or advice
may not manifest for years. We do not consider Net Promoter Score
or other similar surveys sufficient to measure customer outcomes.122

It must be recognized, however, that this is a complex issue. As noted
in a recent G30 report, “[b]anks are searching for metrics to assist in
monitoring and understanding cultural progress over time, and while a
120. Id. at 400.
121. STUDY GRP. ON CORP. BDS., BRIDGING BOARD GAPS 24 (2011), https://www0.gsb.
columbia.edu/faculty/ghubbard/StudyGroup_3%2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5BK-4C4Z].
122. FIN. MKTS. AUTH. & RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., BANK CONDUCT AND CULTURE: FINDINGS
FROM AN FMA AND RBNZ REVIEW OF CONDUCT AND CULTURE IN NEW ZEALAND RETAIL BANKS
15 (2018), https://fma.govt.nz/assets/Reports/_versions/11883/Bank-Conduct-and-Culture-Review.
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WRG-G9PE].
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broad range of metrics has been adopted, most banks are still
experimenting and have neither found a definitive set of indicators nor
concluded what those metrics should be.”123
B. Ineffective Challenge of Management
Boards have failed to challenge executive management adequately
and effectively. It may be difficult for boards to effectively perform this
essential task of supervision of executive management in circumstances
where the executive management has not provided the board with
adequate data to enable them to do so. This can arise where, for example,
the executive management has a conscious or unconscious bias against
providing data to the board that may raise an issue with the performance
of the executive management. This is a matter for the board to resolve,
given its overall responsibility for corporate governance.
Lack of effective challenge can also arise where there are issues of
groupthink at board level, where the board chooses—again, consciously
or unconsciously—not to dig too deeply and challenge generally accepted
approaches within the firm.
A group, such as a board, is particularly vulnerable to groupthink
when its members are similar in background, the group is insulated from
outside opinions, and there are no clear rules for decision-making.124
Additionally,
One of the root causes of Groupthink is cultural cohesiveness. In a
cohesive group, members avoid speaking out against decisions, avoid
arguing with others and work towards maintaining friendly
relationships in the group. If cohesiveness gets to such a high level
that there are no longer disagreements between members, then the
group is ripe for Groupthink.125

In light of this potential problem of groupthink, regulators
internationally have increasingly focused attention on ensuring increased
diversity at the board level, including gender diversity, given that “a lack
of diversity at senior management and board level is a leading indicator of
heightened behaviour and culture risks.”126

123. GRP. OF THIRTY, supra note 42, at 33.
124. Yousef A. Valine, Why Cultures Fail: The Power and Risk of Groupthink, 11 J. RISK
MGMT. FIN. INST. 301, 302 (2018).
125. Id.
126. Ed Sibley, Deputy Governor, Cent. Bank of Ir., Speech at the Central Bank/Trinity College
Dublin School of Law Conference: Culture, Diversity and the Way Forward for Corporate Governance
in Ireland (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/culture-diversity-and-the-wayforward---deputy-governor-ed-sibley [https://perma.cc/WB7G-HA8E].
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C. Over-Focus on Short-Term Profitability
Boards have focused on short-term profitability to the detriment of
longer-term sustainability or to an adequate consideration of stakeholders
other than shareholders. This shareholder value “mindset” has resulted in
decisions being taken at board level (or issues not being adequately
considered at board level) that have eventually proven to be very costly to
the financial services firms, as well as to their customers and to wider
society.127
In the sections below, we consider how boards could improve their
effectiveness in relation to each of these three issues, and in particular, in
the context of an industry-wide approach that could facilitate the
development of (1) improved norms of behavior across the industry (i.e.,
greater clarity around what “good” performance looks like for boards, as
opposed to mere minimum legal requirements); (2) benchmarked
assessments that could enable boards to gain a better insight into how they
are progressing, in particular by reference to the industry as a whole; and
(3) peer pressure to improve performance.
V. THE BENEFITS OF INDUSTRY-WIDE INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THESE
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS ISSUES
Before considering the above three specific proposals for an
industry-wide approach, we should first consider the benefits of
addressing these issues on an industry-wide basis.
A. The “Coordination Failure” Problem
In the first place, in our view, certain types of industry initiatives
have the potential to improve firms’ cultures because they can address the
“coordination failure” problem identified by the New York Federal
Reserve. A December 2017 New York Federal Reserve White Paper on
“Misconduct Risk, Culture and Supervision”128 identifies a number of
market failures to explain why firms do not invest adequately in “cultural
capital,” the reasoning including coordination failures. The coordination
failures reflect the inability of private actors to reach a common objective
127. SALZ, supra note 45, at 11 (“Sir David Walker [Barclays Bank Chairman] and Antony
Jenkins [Barclays Bank CEO] acknowledge that there were gaps between Barclays’ publicly
articulated values and its business practices. They accept that Barclays took some decisions which
were based on short-term considerations and were not always in the interests of its customers. As
Antony Jenkins said in the 2012 Annual Report: ‘For the past 30 years, banking has been progressively
too aggressive, too focused on the short term, too disconnected from the needs of our customers and
clients, and wider society and we lost our way.’”).
128. STEPHANIE CHALY ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., MISCONDUCT RISK, CULTURE,
AND SUPERVISION 8–9 (2017), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-andculture-reform/2017-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/876T-96KC].
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that is in the collective best interest—this is because short-term
competitive pressures make it difficult to invest in longer-term cultural
capital.
In this regard, the financial services industry as a whole is becoming
increasingly aware of the positive impact of a good ethical culture on its
business success and the profitability.129 This may become an increasingly
significant factor, in particular, in those areas of the financial services
industry that are, as a result of technological innovation and regulatory
change, opening up to competitors who are not traditional financial
services operators. There is also the potential benefit of lower compliance
costs in the longer term as improved culture leads to fewer breaches of
regulatory requirements (for example, where an improved culture of
speaking up leads to potential regulatory issues being identified and
addressed at a much earlier stage than they might otherwise be) and a more
constructive relationship with the regulator.
The New York Federal Reserve White Paper recognizes that “the
Group of Thirty efforts around standard-setting and convening the
industry and the U.K.’s Banking Standards Board should help solve
coordination failures and drive industry solutions.”130
The U.K. Banking Standards Board—and the setting up in Ireland of
an equivalent industry-funded body, the Irish Banking Culture Board—
provides a particularly interesting forum for industry initiatives to improve
banking culture.
In this regard, the U.K. Banking Standards Board states that its role
is to “provide challenge, support and scrutiny for firms committed to
rebuilding the sector’s reputation, and it will provide impartial and
objective assessments of the industry’s progress.”131 It is partly doing this
through annual assessments of member banks (carried out through, inter
alia, an anonymous survey questionnaire within firms and interviews) and
the publication of non-firm specific information about the results of the
assessments.132
B. Peer Pressure
Peer pressure is a key influencer of behaviors and can be used to
complement regulation to improve behaviors (if appropriately harnessed).
129. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES & RUTH STEINHOLTZ, ETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICE AND
REGULATION: A BEHAVIOURAL AND VALUES-BASED APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT 104–107 (2017).
130. CHALY ET AL., supra note 128, at 15–16.
131. What is the BSB?, supra note 5.
132. Assessment Results, BANKING STANDARDS BOARD (2018), https://www.bankingstandards
board.org.uk/assessment-results-2018/ [https://perma.cc/SLF6-QLCT].
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As noted by the DNB, “In essence, peer pressure regulates behaviour.”133
Additionally, the 2013 U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards report, which recommended the creation of an industry
standards body in the U.K., stated that
[It] believe[s] that the influence of a professional body for banking
could assist the development of the culture within the industry by
introducing non-financial incentives, which nonetheless have
financial implications, such as peer pressure and the potential to
shame and discipline miscreants. Such a body could, by its very
existence, be a major force for cultural change.134

A peer-based approach can serve to identify best practice
internationally—in relation to matters such as constructive challenge at
board meetings, to address groupthink concerns—and facilitate the
“normalization” of such practices and their “internalization,” so that
executives and board members more readily accept these norms as the
appropriate way to behave rather than merely a form of regulatory
requirement or expectation to be tolerated, at best.
As to whether there are sufficient incentives for the industry to
engage meaningfully in such peer-based initiatives, at least in Ireland,
there is significant political pressure on banks to improve their culture,135
particularly in light of the recent tracker mortgage scandal, and this
political pressure gave rise to the creation of the Irish Banking Culture
Board.136
C. Focusing of Resources
Industry initiatives in this area enable firms to combine and focus
resources on complex multi-disciplinary issues relating to behaviours that
firms may have practical difficulties in addressing on their own (or may
be unprepared to invest internally or provide the resources to invest in
external experts to address these issues).137
133. SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE, supra note 3, at 50.
134. HOUSE OF LORDS & HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 47, at 44.
135. See, e.g., Press Release, Paschal Donohoe T.D., Minister for Fin. & Pub. Expenditure &
Reform, Statement on the Tracker Mortgage Examination (Oct. 25, 2017), http://paschal
donohoe.ie/?p=47378 [https://perma.cc/2QZ6-U8KM].
136. See, e.g., Press Release, Paschal Donohoe T.D., Minister for Fin. & Pub. Expenditure &
Reform, Minister Donohoe Welcomes Banking Initiative That Aims to Rebuild Trust in the Industry
(Dec. 31, 2017), http://paschaldonohoe.ie/minister-donohoe-welcomes-banking-initiative-that-aimsto-rebuild-trust-in-the-industry/ [https://perma.cc/VW2H-A328]. See generally Aengus Cox,
Explainer: The Tracker Mortgage Scandal, RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS ÉIREANN (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.
rte.ie/news/business/2017/1025/915149-explainer-the-tracker-mortgage-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/E
5EY-DGZ8] (discussing the tracker mortgage scandal in Ireland).
137. BANKING STANDARDS BD., ANNUAL REVIEW 2018/2019, at 7 (2019), https://www.
bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/pdf/banking-standards-annual-review-2018-2019.pdf [https://perma.
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D. The Benefits/Drawbacks of Relying on Regulators to Achieve Culture
Change
It must be recognized that in terms of addressing complex
behavioural issues within firms, only so much can be achieved by the
imposition of increasingly onerous regulatory requirements, greater
regulatory scrutiny, and increased sanctions on firms and individuals. For
example, a 2016 U.K. Financial Conduct Authority paper found that
The evidence that we have suggests that there are limitations on the
extent to which greater compliance can be achieved by increasing
fines and the probability of detection. For example, there is a
tendency of certain firms to carry on breaking rules in spite of
continuing to accrue large fines.138

More generally, relying wholly on increased regulation and
enforcement can be counterproductive in terms of improving behaviours.
As argued by Hodges and Steinholtz in their recent book Ethical Business
Practice and Regulation,
An increase in monitoring, reporting and compliance in general can
inadvertently increase unethical behaviour, as people feel they are
not trusted. Companies can spend large amounts of energy on
compliance and have little left over for ethics. Focusing on rules
crowds out objective thought on whether behaviour is ethical.
Focusing on compliance can engender cynicism and disengagement,
as the implicit message is ‘we are only doing this because it is the
law’ and ‘we don’t trust you’. Disengagement clearly feeds unethical
behaviour directly and indirectly as disengaged employees are less
likely to speak up and report issues.139

The DNB supervisory approach has the potential to significantly
improve the level of self-reflection at the board level of behavioral issues,
including in relation to constructive challenge and addressing risks of
groupthink, to lead to improvements in the industry. The DNB has a highly
experienced team of experts in organizational behavior, which assesses
firms’ organizational behaviors—including by way of attending board
meetings—and makes suggestions, if appropriate, to firms for
improvement.140
cc/7ZK2-LFNC] (“We are committed to identifying, supporting and sharing best practice across a
wide range of issues, and to helping firms develop practical interventions and assess the effectiveness
of these interventions. To carry through this wider work, we are very much supported not only by
many member firms but by other organisations in other sectors and wider civil society.”).
138. ZANNA ISCENKO ET AL., BEHAVIOUR AND COMPLIANCE IN ORGANISATIONS 15 (2016),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/op16-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XU9-SXNG].
139. HODGES & STEINHOLTZ, supra note 129, at xxv.
140. See SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE, supra note 3, at 82–83.
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The DNB approach is highly significant and influential, in terms of
providing the expertise and constructive challenge to firms regarding the
behaviors that is expected of firms, including board members.141
Nevertheless, the DNB has some potential limitations in terms of
achieving the desired outcome of improved behaviour and culture:
 It is a “top-down” regulatory approach that has the potential to
give rise to moral licensing (all behaviors that are not specifically
criticized by the regulator may be considered by the firm to be
perfectly acceptable). Some firms and board members might also
take a minimalist regulatory compliance-based approach and not
look beyond what they may deem to be regulatory “impositions”
in terms of standards of behavior to be adopted by them. In other
words, the DNB methodology might possibly “have the
unintended effect of crowding out firms’ intrinsic motivations to
think seriously about cultural risks.”142
 The approach depends, to an important extent, on sufficient
mutual trust between the regulator and the senior individuals in
the firm so that open conversations can be had between them to
enable a fuller mutual understanding of behaviors and culture, on
the basis of which constructive engagement on potential changes
can be held. If senior individuals in the firm are concerned,
however, the information or views that they provide to their
regulator may subsequently be used by the regulator against
them or colleagues (for example, in the context of a fitness and
probity review of an individual) or in a formal sanctions
proceeding against the firm, it may be very difficult to establish
the necessary level of mutual trust to achieve sufficiently
meaningful reforms.143
E. Industry Initiative Risks?
There is, of course, the risk that industry initiatives may be more
inclined to serve the interests of industry firms rather than consumers. As
Adam Smith famously stated, “People of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”144
Such a risk is significantly mitigated, in the case of the Irish Banking
141. See, e.g., John Conley et al., Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises? The Dutch
Central Bank’s Supervision of Behaviour and Culture, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 773 (2019).
142. HODGES & STEINHOLTZ, supra note 129, at 54.
143. See, e.g., id. at 54–55.
144. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
145 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1981) (1776).
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Culture Board, by virtue of the fact that the board of this organization is
chaired by a former Court of Appeal judge, and a majority of the board is
composed of individuals who are not from the banking industry (they
include representatives of consumer groups).145
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR INDUSTRY-WIDE APPROACHES TO IMPROVE
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS
A. Enhancing the Quality of Data Available to the Board to Enable It
to More Effectively Assess the Alignment of the Firm’s Behaviors
with Its Espoused Values
As noted above, it is important for a board not to have as its sole
source of information the information provided to it by its senior
management team. In this regard, as stated in a U.S. report on corporate
governance, boards should “[e]ncourage direct dialogue with the entire
organization by having routine contact with employees beyond the senior
management team.”146 A useful development in this direction is the U.K.
Banking Standards Board’s (BSB) comprehensive benchmarked annual
assessment process for all of its member banks and building societies. This
provides detailed and benchmarked feedback to boards from their staff.
The high-level results of the first annual assessment were published by the
BSB in 2016.147 Its third annual assessment was published in April
2019.148
The assessment involves an employee survey of over 72,000
employees regarding firm-specific focus groups with employees, written
submissions from boards, and interviews with non-executive directors and
executives.149 The survey results are provided through an online dashboard
that allows the firm to cut and analyze the data in multiple ways, subject
always to constraints imposed to protect respondents’ anonymity.150 Such
145. For information on the current membership of the board of the Irish Banking Culture Board,
see Meet the Board, IRISH BANKING CULTURE BOARD, https://www.irishbankingculture
board.ie/meet-the-board/ [https://perma.cc/N2ZW-Y25R].
146. STUDY GRP. ON CORP. BOARDS, supra note 121, at 13.
147. See BANKING STANDARDS BD., ANNUAL REVIEW 2016/2017, at 28 (2017), https://www.
bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/pdf/banking-standards-annual-review-2016-2017.pdf [https://perma.
cc/C67Y-AFEP].
148. See BANKING STANDARDS BD., supra note 137.
149. Id. at 6.
150. See Alison Cottrell, The UK Banking Standards Board: An Outcome-Based Approach to
Assessing Organisational Culture, 11 J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTS. 47, 52 (2018); see also BANKING
STANDARDS BD., BSB WRITTEN EVIDENCE FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION INTO
MISCONDUCT IN THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 4 (2018),
https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/BSB-submission-to-Aus
tralian-Royal-Commission-into-Misconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG76-LZ9V].
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an industry-wide assessment approach is particularly useful for the reasons
outlined below.
First, it provides a common language to describe relevant cultural
factors and metrics for assessing those factors across the industry. This
makes it easier for boards and other stakeholders to engage in an effective
discussion of culture within their firm, on the basis of a uniform or
common language and a set of metrics derived from industry best practice.
The U.K. Banking Standards Board is clear that it does not seek to
assess firms against a template of what a “good” culture looks like. Rather,
it assesses firms against nine identified characteristics: honesty, respect,
openness, accountability, competence, reliability, responsiveness,
personal and organisational resilience, and shared purpose. According to
the Banking Standards Board
We do not . . . set out to measure or rank culture directly. Rather, we
ask how far each of our nine characteristics is demonstrated by the
firm and relative to other firms. We would expect a firm that strongly
exhibited our nine characteristics to be better equipped and more
likely to service its customers, members and clients well, than one in
which these elements were lacking.151

These nine characteristics are very similar, although not identical, to
the nine common attributes of a healthy culture, identified in the U.K.
Financial Reporting Council’s July 2018 non-binding Guidance on Board
Effectiveness (which accompanies the 2018 U.K. Corporate Governance
Code).152
Second, the U.K. Banking Standards Board assessment is in-depth
and provides a rich source of data, including firm-specific data, that
enables boards of financial services firms to gain an in-depth
understanding of the culture of their firm. The assessment methodology
was, for example, relied on by the Irish Banking Culture Board in its
survey of its five retail bank members; the survey findings, which were
published in April 2019, included: (1) only 59% of respondents believed
that senior leaders in their organization meant what they said;153 (2) 49%
of respondents stated that they see instances where unethical behavior is

151. BANKING STANDARDS BD., BSB ANNUAL REVIEW 2017/2018, at 81 (2018), https://www.
bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/pdf/banking-standards-annual-review-2017-2018.pdf [https://perma.
cc/T9SZ-QGES].
152. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 6 (2018) (identifying the
following nine characteristics: honesty, openness, respect, adaptability, recognition, acceptance of
challenge, accountability, and shared purpose).
153. IRISH BANKING CULTURE BD., EMPLOYEE SURVEY 2018, at 9 (2019), https://212528644444-raikfcquaxqncofqfm.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Irish-BankingEmployee-Survey-2018-summary-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J89-BUJ6].

754

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:723

rewarded;154 and (3) 47% of respondents believed that if they raised
concerns about the way they work, they would be worried about the
negative consequences for them.155 The Banking Standards Board
provides firm-specific data to the board of each participating firm and
discusses it with the firm (but publishes only high-level aggregated
data).156 The Board is clear that participation in the assessment “demands
a readiness on the part of board members and the executives to be selfcritical and to ask questions of themselves and their employees that may
elicit unexpected and unwelcome answers.”157
Third, firms receive benchmarked data, so that they can assess their
performance in the context of the norms of the wider industry. The relevant
comparison data “include a range and quartile against the equivalent
category across all relevant firms.”158
Fourth, the published results may create a form of peer pressure for
boards to address any identified issues of concern.
And fifth, the results also enable the Banking Standards Board to
carry out further work on industry standards of good practice, where issues
of concern have been identified.
B. Better Understanding the Customer Perspective
In order for a board to properly assess whether its firm’s behaviors
are aligned with its espoused values, it will also need a data set related to
the perspective of its customers. This is particularly important given the
opportunities for financial services firms to take advantage of customers,
especially retail customers.
In the first place, such opportunities for taking advantage of
customers can arise as a result of market power.159 This market power can
derive particularly in retail markets from, for example, customer inertia
and their lack of financial literacy. As stated in a recent U.K. Competition
and Markets Authority (CMA) retail banking market investigation report
154. Id. at 35.
155. Id. at 20 (responding to the survey question, “[i]f I raised concerns about the way we work,
I would be worried about the negative consequences for me,” 22% of respondents responded with
“strongly agreed” and 25% with “somewhat agree”).
156. See, e.g., BANKING STANDARDS BD., supra note 137, at 19.
157. Id. at 64.
158. Id. at 66.
159. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ASSESSMENT OF MARKET POWER: UNDERSTANDING
COMPETITION LAW 9 (2004), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system
/uploads/attachment_data/file/284400/oft415.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN3G-WEXD] (“Market power
can be thought of as the ability profitably to sustain prices above competitive levels or restrict output
or quality below competitive levels. An undertaking with market power might also have the ability
and incentive to harm the process of competition in other ways; for example, by weakening existing
competition, raising entry barriers or slowing innovation.”).
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The behaviour of customers can play a central role in providing
competitive constraints on providers. This happens if customers are
engaged and willing to search for and implicitly threaten to switch to
another provider, which offers them a better deal. Conversely, a lack
of customer engagement in the market reduces banks’ incentives to
compete.160

Customer inertia and limited financial literacy appear to be particular
issues of concern in retail financial services markets. With regard to
customer inertia, a November 2017 bulletin from the CBI noted that the
number of bank current accounts held by personal consumers in Ireland in
the first half of 2017 was just over 5.28 million and that, during this period,
the number of switches of current accounts from one credit institution to
another was 2,715—a switching rate of 0.05%.161 This rate of switching is
considerably lower than the 3% annual rate162 noted by the U.K.
Competition and Markets Authority for personal consumer accounts in its
study of the U.K. market—which the CMA considered to be “very low”
and a factor resulting in the imposition of regulatory remedies on retail
banks in the U.K. to address competition concerns.163
As for retail customer financial literacy, as noted by Governor of the
Central Bank of Ireland, Philip Lane, in a February 2017 speech, “A vast
empirical literature shows that consumers tend to make poor financial
choices, taking on too much debt, misunderstanding investment risk and
choosing financial products that do not match their needs.”164
Even in competitive markets, customers risk being taken advantage
of. In the 2015 book by Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Robert
Shiller, Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and
160. COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, RETAIL BANKING MARKET INVESTIGATION:
FINAL REPORT, at xvi (2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57ac9667e5274a0f
6c00007a/retail-banking-market-investigation-full-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9A7-9FNJ].
161. CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, CONSUMER PROTECTION BULLETIN: CURRENT ACCOUNTS AND
SWITCHING 2 (2017), http://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/Regulation/consumer-protection
/compliance-monitoring/reviews-and-research/consumer-protection-bulletin—-current-accountsand-switching—-november-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP9K-MPDR]; see Press Release, Paschal
Donohoe T.D., Minister for Fin. & Pub. Expenditure & Reform, Minister Donohoe Launches Phase
Two of Switch Your Bank Campaign (Jan. 22, 2018), http://paschaldonohoe.ie/minister-donohoelaunches-phase-two-of-switch-your-bank-campaign
[https://perma.cc/8WEU-7R2R]
(“The
Department of Finance is running this campaign as part of a range of competition measures agreed
with the European Commission to raise awareness and promote customer switching in the retail
financial product area. This was agreed in the context of the restructuring plans for AIB and PTSB.
The campaign is being funded entirely by the two banks.”).
162. COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, supra note 160, at 155.
163. Id. at 423.
164. Press Release, Philip R. Lane, Governor, Cent. Bank of Ir., The Role of Financial
Regulation in Protecting Consumers (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/
financial-regulation-protecting-consumers-governor-lane [https://perma.cc/J5AC-MM4F].
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Deception, the authors argue that, even in competitive markets, sellers
systematically exploit our psychological weaknesses and our ignorance
through manipulation and deception.165
A recent example of such “phishing” arose in the March 2019 fine
imposed by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority on The Carphone
Warehouse for misleading customers in the sale of mobile phone insurance
products over a seven-year period.166 The firm was fined over £29 million
for this conduct.167
In light of these issues, the ongoing work of the U.K. Banking
Standards Board to develop a Consumer Framework is interesting and
potentially useful. In November 2017, the Banking Standards Board
published a consultation document entitled What Do Good Banking
Outcomes Look Like to Consumers?168 This document sets out outcomesfocused criteria for assessing what good consumer outcomes look like. The
criteria they have identified were access, choice, clarity, and transparency,
safety and security, redress and being listened to, value for money, and
fairness.169
The development of these industry-agreed criteria for assessing
customer outcomes will likely be helpful in providing an industry-agreed
language for assessing the consumer perspective (i.e., going beyond a
minimalist approach of focusing on issues such as volume of complaints
received). More generally, in our view, there may be a benefit in an
industry approach or benchmarking to develop best practice in the area of
dealing with customer complaints and to ensure that there is sufficiently
useful board-level engagement on this issue. This would enable boards to
assess effectively whether the behaviors of the firm are in line with
espoused values (and to mitigate against the risk of board “blind spots” in
relation to this):
165. See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE
ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (2015).
166. Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., FCA Fines the Carphone Warehouse Over €29m for
Insurance Mis-Selling (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/fca-fines-the-carphone-warehouseover-29-million-for-insurance-misselling [https://perma.cc/8GNU-G9DY] (finding that during the
seven-year period, policies worth almost €450 million were sold, although the Financial Conduct
Authority found that in many cases the product had little or no value to customers or was unsuitable
for them).
167. Id.
168. BANKING STANDARDS BD., WHAT DO GOOD BANKING OUTCOMES LOOK LIKE TO
CONSUMERS? (2017) [hereinafter BSB, CONSULTATION], https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk
/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/What-do-good-banking-outcomes-look-like-to-consumers.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KWY9-LQDV]; BANKING STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE BSB
CONSULTATION ON WHAT GOOD BANKING OUTCOMES LOOK LIKE TO CONSUMERS (2018),
https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Summary-of-responses-toConsumer-Consultation.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV33-TCKU]
169. BSB, CONSULTATION, supra note 168, at 4.
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Customer complaints provide a potentially significant
countervailing influence on firms that will assist boards to
identify and possibly address issues in which the firm takes
unfair advantage of its customers (whether intentionally or
otherwise). As stated by Dr. Ken Henry, Chairman of National
Australian Bank (and former Australian Treasury Secretary) in
evidence to the Australian Royal Commission into misconduct
in the Australian financial services industry: “So how do you
measure customer outcomes?---Mainly—mainly through
complaints from customers, to be honest.”170
Financial services firms are subject to regulatory requirements in
relation to complaints management.171 The requirements,
however, broadly tend to be procedural in nature.172 There would
be a benefit in industry considering this issue not simply from a
regulatory or procedural perspective but increasingly from the
perspective of the board’s role in assessing whether the actual
practices of their firm diverges from its stated values.
Any such articulation of industry best practices and potential
benchmarking would serve to address the risk of complacency of
firms regarding the adequacy of their complaint management
systems by subjecting the systems to constructive peer appraisal;
in the words of Onora O’Neill, commenting on the role of the
U.K. Banking Standards Board, “it is like someone else holding
a mirror at an unfamiliar angle to give a view that in-house
exercises may not provide.”173
As outlined in the Introduction to this article, there is currently a
major problem of lack of public trust in the financial services

170. Transcript of Proceedings at 7117, In the Matter of a Royal Commission into Misconduct
in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (Commonwealth Austl., Nov. 26,
2018), https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/public-hearings/Documents/transcripts-2018
/transcript-26-November-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZY9-EY7V].
171. See generally CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE 2012, at 66–68
(2015), https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/consumer-protection/other-codesof-conduct/4-gns-4-2-7-cp-code-2012.pdf?sfvrsn=6 [https://perma.cc/5GM7-49UA] (showing the
relevant requirements relating to complaints management in Ireland).
172. See generally CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, A GUIDE TO CONSUMER PROTECTION RISK
ASSESSMENT 17 (2017), https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/regulation/consumerprotection/170328-cpra-guide-28-march-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/VN9N-3WHA] (Under
the CBI’s Consumer Protection Risk Assessment Model, firms are expected to have effective
complaints management systems in place, including systems to address “[r]oot cause analysis of
complaints, appeals, issues or other matters escalated in relation to Consumer Protection Risk and
evidence that this analysis was used to mitigate future similar risks[.]”).
173. Baroness Onora O’Neill, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks by Baroness Onora O’Neill:
What is Banking For? (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/remarks-bybaroness-onora-oneill/ [https://perma.cc/78UJ-NBW6].
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industry.174 The trustworthiness of the financial services industry
may improve, and trust in this industry may thereby increase, if
the industry further improves its standards in relation to the
handling of customer complaints.
It may be that customers are more likely to complain to their financial
institution if they consider that the chances of their complaint being
effectively considered increase—interestingly, the Australian Royal
Commission received over 10,000 customer complaints during the course
of its deliberations.175 This has the benefit for firms of providing useful
indicators of potential misconduct risk. Indeed, whilst individual customer
complaints may appear to be relatively trivial to boards, trend data
including qualitative information on the trends can provide useful
indicators of potential misconduct risk176 (and would likely have proven
useful to the boards of Wells Fargo and the U.K. banks dealing with PPI,
described above, had they paid sufficiently close attention to such
information that could and should have been available to them).
B. Effective Constructive Challenge by Boards of Executive Team
Each individual director on a board is individually responsible for
engaging in effective constructive challenge of the executive team to
ensure that the strategy and cultural values set by the board are being
properly implemented by the executive team. Thus, for example, Article
91(8) CRD IV states that “[e]ach member of the management body [board]
shall act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind to effectively
assess and challenge the decisions of the senior management where
necessary and to effectively oversee and monitor management decisionmaking.”177 With regard to the criterion of “independence of mind,” the
joint European Securities and Markets Authority/European Banking
Authority Guidelines provide that, when assessing an individual’s
“independence of mind,” the assessing regulator should consider whether
the individual has “the necessary behavioural skills, including: i. courage,
conviction and strength to effectively assess and challenge the proposed
decisions of other members of the management body; ii. being able to ask
174. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, for example, has stated that “the incidence
of financial sector misconduct has risen to a level that has the potential to create systemic risks by
undermining trust in both financial institutions and markets.” Carney, supra note 2, at 7.
175. ROYAL COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 58, at xxxv.
176. See, e.g., CENT. BANK OF IRELAND, supra note 171, at 68 (“A regulated entity must
undertake an appropriate analysis of the patterns of complaints from consumers on a regular basis
including investigating whether complaints indicate an isolated issue or a more widespread issue for
consumers. This analysis of consumer complaints must be escalated to the regulated entity’s
compliance/risk function and senior management.”).
177. Council Directive 2013/36, art. 91, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 386 (EU).

2020]

The Role of the Board of Financial Services Firms

759

questions to the members of the management body in its management
function; and iii. being able to resist ‘group-think.’”178 Apart from this
individual assessment in the context of a fitness and probity application
process, boards are also required to carry out regular reviews of their
effectiveness.179
These review processes, together with ongoing supervision, provide
regulators with some insights into the effectiveness of boards and
individual members of boards. There is a limit, however, to how useful an
insight can be when gained from process-driven regulatory engagements
(e.g., reviews of board minutes that can often be relatively short and
focused on decisions taken rather than the nature and extent of discussion
at the board meeting, are unlikely to give particularly useful insights into
the dynamics of board meetings and the effectiveness of board-level
challenges of the executive team).
Accordingly, as outlined above, we consider that there is merit in
industry initiatives to identify, “normalize,” and potentially benchmark
best practice in relation to how board members can best engage in
constructive challenge whilst maintaining the effectiveness of the board as
a whole.
Given that groupthink has been identified as an issue of concern by
regulators—according to Andrew Haldane, The Bank of England’s Chief
Economist, “groupthink was the reason most banks (as well as many
regulators, central banks and academics) failed in 2008”180—an industry
culture and standards body could, using inter-disciplinary approaches,
usefully identify international best practice, to address this problem and
the issue of effective constructive challenge at the board level.
178. EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MKTS. AUTH. & EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., FINAL REPORT:
JOINT ESMA AND EBA GUIDELINES ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SUITABILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE
MANAGEMENT BODY AND KEY FUNCTION HOLDERS UNDER DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU AND DIRECTIVE
2014/65/EU, at 38 (2017), https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/
1972984/43592777-a543-4a42-8d39-530dd4401832/Joint%20ESMA%20and%20EBA%20Guidelin
es%20on%20the%20assessment%20of%20suitability%20of%20members%20of%20the%20manage
ment%20body%20and%20key%20function%20holders%20(EBA-GL-2017-12).pdf [https://perma.
cc/U7YS-M6EW].
179. Council Directive 2013/36, art. 88, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 384 (EU).
180. Andrew G. Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Opening Remarks Given at the
Investment Association Launch of the Diversity Project (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2016/the-diversity-project.pdf?la=en&hash=1148C
462A4E677583E61EEB5B957253B49115848 [https://perma.cc/G32S-T966]; see also IRISH
BANKING CULTURE REPORT, supra note 8, at 5, 29 (“[W]e found the banks have much more work to
do in terms of ensuring their organisations are sufficiently diverse and inclusive, particularly at senior
level, to prevent group-think, guard against over-confidence, and promote internal
challenge . . . [g]roup-think has been identified as a contributing factor to the financial crisis. Research
suggests that diversity at senior levels can help to reduce the likelihood of group-think, improve
decision-making, increase the level of challenge, and improve risk management.”).
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In this regard, it is interesting to note that the U.K. Banking Standards
Board has created a new unit, called “BSB Insights,” that will draw on
insights from behavioral economics and organizational psychology to
identify cultural or behavioral factors that enable, promote, or inhibit high
standards in banking, understand their causes, and help to test the
effectiveness of interventions.181
Any such guidance on best practice could also look at the related core
behavioral problem of a lack of speaking up within financial services firms
and the approach of the board and board members to addressing this.
Whilst boards may well have approved and appropriate processes and
procedures in place to enable and facilitate speaking up, this is of limited
use if, in practice, there is a culture that does not encourage speaking up.
As noted by the U.K. Banking Standards Board,
Encouraging people to speak out and challenge—something that is
central to a good risk culture—requires effort on the part of those
leading an organisation to address all of the many factors that will
reinforce conformity; to make, in other words, challenge and
continuous improvement so acceptable that they become the norm.
This requires not just talking about what’s expected, but acting it out:
demonstrating constructive challenge, for example; inviting and
visibly responding to feedback; or sharing personal examples about
speaking out, being challenged or making and learning from
mistakes.
To have credibility and carry weight, especially on an issue as
difficult as speaking up, leaders need not just to tell stories about what
is expected; they need to be in the stories that other people are telling.
One interesting aspect of the assessment focus group discussions, in
this context, is the extent to which participants talking about values
or behaviours refer to the example set by their leaders or managers,
or whether the latter are notable by their absence.182

C. Clarifying the Purpose of the Firm
The role of a corporation in society is becoming a topic of increasing
public discussion.183 A bank’s role in wider society and its “social license
to operate”184 is also an issue of concern to financial services regulators
globally. As stated in a 2015 speech by a Vice President of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
181. BANKING STANDARDS BD., supra note 150, at 3–4.
182. Cottrell, supra note 150, at 55.
183. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 19.
184. See, e.g., Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Harvard Club UK
Southwark Cathedral Dinner: Three Truths for Finance (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2015/three-truths-for-finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/57RB-FT8R].
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Banks receive operating benefits unavailable to other industries
because they provide important services to the public. For example,
financial intermediation is enhanced through deposit insurance and
access to the discount window. Public benefits, though, are not a
gift. They are part of a quid pro quo. In exchange for receiving
valuable operating benefits, a bank’s implicit codes of conduct—that
is, its culture—must reflect the public dimension of the services that
banks provide.185

Furthermore, in October 2018, commenting on the proposed new
legislation to introduce a U.K.-style individual accountability regime in
Ireland, Minister for Finance Paschal Donohoe stated that “[his] objective
in legislating for expanded Central Bank powers, is to cultivate a
sustainable financial services industry, with rewards reaped over the longterm for customers, staff, and shareholders, and where consideration of the
impact on individuals, the economy and society as a whole is firmly
embedded in organisational culture.”186 Notably, in the U.K., the 2018
revised U.K. Corporate Governance Code 2018 provides, as one of its core
principles, that the role of the board of a company is to “promote the longterm sustainable success of the company, generating value for
shareholders and contributing to wider society.”187 This goes beyond the
shareholder-value focus of companies in recent decades. Also, in
Australia, a proposed revised edition of the Australian Corporate
Governance Principles and Recommendations proposes to introduce a new
principle regarding listed entities’ social license to operate. “A listed entity
should instill and continually reinforce a culture across the organisation of
acting lawfully, ethically and in a socially responsible manner.”188 Further,
in the U.S., Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed a legislative bill that
would require certain-sized U.S. corporations to take account of a range
of stakeholders, going beyond shareholders.189

185. Alberto G. Musalem, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
Towards a New Age of Responsibility in Banking and Finance: Getting the Culture and Ethics Right:
Why Focus on Culture? (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/
2015/mus151123 [https://perma.cc/7HPT-22HW].
186. Paschal Donohoe T.D., Minister for Fin. & Pub. Expenditure & Reform, Cent. Bank of Ir.,
Speech to Central Bank/TCD Conference: Culture, Diversity and the Way Forward for Corporate
Governance in Ireland (Oct. 25, 2018), http://paschaldonohoe.ie/central-banktcd-conference-culturediversity-the-way-forward-for-corporate-governance-in-ireland/ [https://perma.cc/QRP9-W8GG].
187. U.K. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 4.
188. ASX CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2019), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/consultationdraft-cgc-4th-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2VX-2CED].
189. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountableonly-to-shareholders-1534287687 (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
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Interestingly, in the U.K., the British Academy is currently engaged
in a major research project on the future of the corporation.190 The program
aims to “contribute to . . . [redefining] business [in] the 21st century and
build[ing] trust between business and society.”191 In December 2018, the
Academy published its initial research conclusions,192 pointing to the need
to develop a new framework for the corporation around three
interconnected principles: (1) well-defined and aligned purposes, (2) a
commitment to trustworthiness, and (3) embedding an enabling culture.
Also, according to the initial research conclusions, this shift would require
co-ordinated action on a new approach to the use of five identified levers,
relating to: ownership, corporate governance, regulation, taxation, and
investment.193
The next phase of this major research project is continuing in 2019,
looking at precise business practice and policy implications of the
proposed framework; in particular, it will consider the laws and regulation,
ownership and governance, and measurement and management required
by the proposed new framework.194
As to the issue of a proposed shift from the current “shareholder
value” paradigm of corporations to a future paradigm in which
corporations take greater account of a wider social purpose, the research
paper notes the development of the Friedman Doctrine, essentially
equating corporate purpose with shareholder profits. While this doctrine
may have addressed the problem of the lack of sufficient accountability of
managers of a firm:
It is at this point that our research suggests the nature of the
corporation erred. While it was right to be concerned about the lack
of accountability of management, it was wrong to see its resolution
in control by one party to the firm. The reason why this happened was
that the rights of shareholders were equated with the property rights
of owners. Shareholders bore the risks and rewards of the success and
failure of business and so had corresponding rights to control it.
But shareholders are not in many cases owners in any meaningful
sense of the word and do not aspire to act as owners. This
misconception and preoccupation with one single party to the firm

190. The Future of the Corporation, THE BRITISH ACAD. (2017), https://www.thebritishacademy
.ac.uk/programmes/future-of-the-corporation [https://perma.cc/9BMB-32YL].
191. Id.
192. THE BRITISH ACAD., REFORMING BUSINESS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A FRAMEWORK FOR
THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION (2018), https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default
/files/Reforming-Business-for-21st-Century-British-Academy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW6Y-D236].
193. Id. at 8–10.
194. Id. at 25.
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rather than a wider constituency has been the cause of mounting
environmental concerns, social tensions and political backlash.
These have become particularly acute since the 2007–8 Financial
Crisis, as many of the defects of the conventional wisdom were laid
bare.195

In our view, addressing this issue of corporate purpose will be a key
element in improving trust in the financial services industry over time. For
many consumers, their distrust of the financial services industry derives to
a significant extent from evidence that this industry has focused on shortterm profit maximizing at the expense of consumer interest. This consumer
perception appears to us to derive, at least in part, from a view that the
“mindset” of those in the financial services industry is based on the above
Friedman Doctrine, which, in extremis, suggests that firms can go to any
lengths to profit maximize, unless specifically prohibited by law or the
regulator—i.e., consumers cannot rely on financial firms to look after their
interests, unless specifically required to do so by law or the regulator, and,
even then, any reliance placed by customers on financial institutions
complying with the law can be misplaced.196
This problem is compounded by a range of issues that arise in the
financial services industry, described earlier in this paper, including: (1)
information asymmetries between the financial services provider and the
customer (reinforced by generally low levels of financial literacy of retail
consumers); (2) conflicts of interest in financial services firms; (3) market
power of firms, particularly arising from lack of customer
engagement/willingness to switch provider; and (4) the relatively high
rewards for the staff of financial services firms in successfully contributing
to short-term profits of the firm, sometimes with little, if any, downside
for doing so at the expense of the customer interest (other than compliance
with clear minimum legal requirements).
As outlined above, in accordance with the framework for assessing
culture set out by Edgar Schein, where the culture of a firm involves
widespread discrepancies between desired behaviors and observed
behaviors, as is the case in the financial services industry, leaders need to
“locate the cultural DNA and change some of that”197 or, in other words,
address culture issues at the level of taken-for-granted underlying basic
assumptions and not merely at the level of artifacts or espoused values and
beliefs.
195. THE BRITISH ACAD., supra note 192, at 14–15.
196. See, e.g., Press Release, Paschal Donohoe T.D., Minister for Fin. & Pub. Expenditure &
Reform, Statement on the Tracker Mortgage Examination (Oct. 25, 2017), http://paschaldonohoe.
ie/?p=47378 [https://perma.cc/6RAG-QU9R].
197. SCHEIN, supra note 23, at 27.
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It is our view, therefore, that a key to improving culture in the
financial services industry in the longer term will be addressing the need
to tackle the “Friedman Doctrine” mindset in the industry (and in
corporations more widely) and recognizing the need for firms’ purposes
to encompass wider purposes than “shareholder value.”
There is a limited amount that firms can do individually to address
this industry-wide mindset issue, given, for example, the coordination
failures problem identified by the New York Federal Reserve as discussed
above.
Accordingly, bodies such as the U.K. Banking Standards Board and
Irish Banking Culture Board would be particularly well-placed to build on
the above-described on-going work of the British Academy to consider
how financial services firms can embed a “mindset” regarding the purpose
of the firm that takes sufficient account of the interests of a wider range of
stakeholders than merely those of shareholders.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Boards of financial services firms have a clear and critical role in
establishing the values of the firm and monitoring whether the behaviors
of the firm are aligned with these values.
Quite apart from ensuring that appropriate structures and governance
are in place, increasingly more is expected of boards in terms of ensuring
that they (1) have available to them the best and most reliable information
in order to enable them to perform this function effectively—and to
proactively seek out further information and explanations where there are
indications available to the board that actual behaviors within the firm do
not align with stated values; and (2) constructively challenge executive
management.
In our view, given that, as noted above by the DNB, “in essence, peer
pressure regulates behaviour,”198 there is merit in improving the standard
of board performance in these particular areas on the basis of industrywide initiatives, as suggested in this Article. Any such initiatives would,
of course, be in addition to minimum standards of behavior as established
by law and regulatory requirements and expectations.
Furthermore, there is also merit, for the same reasons in our view, in
industry-wide engagement in the evolving public debate, to address the
issue of the mindset within the industry, which is arguably based on the
shareholder value, or Friedman Doctrine, and if and how this can evolve
into a wider conception of the purpose of a financial services organization
in society.
198. SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE, supra note 3, at 50.

